Tinubu Expands Campaign to More Cities, States to Match Atiku, Obi, Makinde’s Campaigns

• Considers campaigning across all 36 states in new strategy as train moves to Dutse, Ibadan 

•Ex-Vice President’s Sokoto, Kebbi rallies put presidency on alert

Olawale Olaleye

Some events of the last few days might have compelled President Bola Tinubu to substantially revise his initial plan to personally campaign in only 12 states, as political developments across northern Nigeria, particularly the growing visibility of former Vice President Atiku Abubakar threatens to complicate the re-election calculations of the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC).

With nearly 63 per cent of Tinubu’s 2023 presidential votes coming from the 19 northern states, the battle to retain that support has become central to his second term ambition.

The changing political atmosphere in northern Nigeria, has forced Tinubu to reconsider the scope of his personal campaign appearances ahead of the January 16, 2027 presidential election, with the possibility of extending his tour to all 36 states of the federation instead of the initial 12 states announced in the released.

Apart from the challenge posed by Atiku, Mr. Peter Obi of the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC) and Seyi Makinde of the Allied People’s Movement (APM), the adjustment to the ruling party’s strategy may also be forced by the growing displeasure over economic hardship and insecurity in sections of the north.

The possibility of an expanded presidential tour acquired greater significance following the impressive public reception accorded Atiku, the African Democratic Congress (ADC) presidential candidate, during the formal commencement of his campaign in Sokoto on November 4.

However, Tinubu’s visit to Jigawa State today for an APC presidential campaign rally and the inauguration of four development projects as well as Ibadan in the coming days buttresses the new thinking in his camp.

The ADC had publicly interpreted the large gathering as evidence of growing discontent with the Tinubu administration and increasing acceptance of Atiku’s promise to make life more affordable.

While the size of political rallies cannot be treated as conclusive evidence of electoral strength, the development has reinforced the need for APC to reassess the political temperature in a region that played a decisive role in Tinubu’s emergence as president in 2023.

It has also raised questions of whether the president can afford to delegate much of his northern campaign to governors, ministers, and other party leaders, when his principal opponent is personally engaging communities where economic hardship and insecurity have become sensitive political issues.

The president’s recent campaign activity has already demonstrated that the original schedule is not immutable. On November 6, he attended a political rally in Akwa Ibom State, which was outside the 12 states earmarked for his personal appearances, before proceeding to Rivers on November 7.

Although there has been no formal announcement expanding his North-west itinerary, the Akwa Ibom rally attendance suggests that additional presidential appearances remain a practical possibility.

The greater consideration, however, is not merely the number of states Tinubu visits, but what he intends to achieve in those states.

The 62 Per Cent That Made Tinubu President

The clearest explanation, perhaps, for the emerging campaign dilemma lies in the electoral arithmetic of 2023.

According to the presidential election results declared by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Tinubu secured 8,794,726 votes nationwide, defeating Atiku, who received 6,984,520 votes, and Peter Obi, who obtained 6,101,533 votes.

Rabiu Kwankwaso, who contested on the platform of New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP), received 1,496,687 votes.

A closer examination of the results reveals that Tinubu obtained approximately 5,507,784 votes from the 19 northern states alone.

That represents 62.6 per cent of his entire national tally, meaning that nearly two out of every three votes credited to Tinubu came from the north. This is fundamental.

It establishes that Tinubu’s victory was significantly dependent on northern voters, notwithstanding his status as South-west political leader and the strong support he enjoyed in his traditional regional base.

Indeed, the 2023 figures show that his advantage over Atiku across the 19 northern states was approximately 348,505 votes, a comparatively narrow margin given the size of the region.

The North-west contributed approximately 2.65 million votes to Tinubu’s total, while the North-central delivered about 1.67 million, and the North-east did approximately 1.19 million.

The implication is unmistakable: the north was not simply an additional source of support, it constituted the foundation upon which Tinubu’s national electoral coalition rested.

Losing a substantial proportion of that support in 2027 could place considerable pressure on his re-election chances, even if he improves his performance elsewhere.

That is particularly important because the 2027 contest is unfolding under circumstances markedly different from those of 2023.

Tinubu is no longer an opposition-style candidate promising a departure from an existing government. He is the incumbent president defending his own economic policies, security record, and administrative decisions.

The electoral calculation this time is less about what he promises to do and more about how Nigerians judge what his administration has already done.

Why the North-west Has Become Critical Battlefield

Of the three northern geopolitical zones, the North-west presents, perhaps, the most consequential political challenge.

With seven states — Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Jigawa, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara — it contains some of the country’s largest voting populations and has historically played a major role in determining presidential outcomes.

In 2023, Tinubu obtained 2,652,235 votes from the region, compared with Atiku’s 2,329,540. This gave Tinubu a zonal advantage of just 322,695 votes. The result, however, concealed a much more complicated electoral pattern.

Atiku actually won four of the seven states: Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi and Sokoto. Tinubu won Jigawa and Zamfara, while Kwankwaso defeated both men in Kano.

Consequently, although Tinubu secured the highest aggregate number of votes in the North-west, he did not dominate the region in terms of the number of states won.

That distinction is particularly important as the 2027 campaign gathers momentum.

In Kaduna, Atiku defeated Tinubu by 554,360 votes to 399,293. In Katsina, the former vice president secured 489,045 votes against Tinubu’s 482,283, winning by only 6,762 votes.

In Kebbi, Atiku polled 285,175 votes against Tinubu’s 248,088, while Sokoto produced one of the closest contests, with Atiku receiving 288,679 votes against Tinubu’s 285,444. The outcome in Sokoto was decided by only 3,235 votes.

Tinubu’s victories were recorded in Jigawa, where he obtained 421,390 votes against Atiku’s 386,587, and Zamfara, where he polled 298,396 against Atiku’s 193,978.

In Kano, Kwankwaso emerged as the dominant political force with 997,279 votes, while Tinubu secured 517,341 and Atiku finished with 131,716. These figures demonstrate just how vulnerable the North-west could become to relatively modest changes in voter preferences.

A swing of fewer than 7,000 votes could have altered the outcome in Katsina in 2023, while approximately 3,300 additional votes for Tinubu could have changed the result in Sokoto.

For Atiku, such narrow margins offer opportunity for consolidating existing support. But for Tinubu, they represent both the possibility of recovering lost territory and the danger of conceding further ground.

Atiku’s Growing Visibility and the Sokoto Signal

Atiku’s decision to open his campaign in Sokoto was politically significant. Apart from being one of the states he won in 2023, Sokoto occupies an important position in the North-west’s religious, traditional and political hierarchy.

His November 4 campaign attracted a large gathering of supporters, prompting ADC Presidential Campaign Council to describe the reception as an expression of dissatisfaction with the Tinubu administration.

According to the opposition party, Atiku’s motorcade spent several hours moving through the city as residents lined major roads to welcome him.

The party subsequently framed the event around its affordability message, presenting Atiku as an alternative to the economic difficulties experienced under the current administration.

The significance of this development lies less in the crowd itself than in the political message accompanying it.

Atiku is attempting to shift the contest away from party affiliations and elite endorsements towards the everyday experiences of ordinary voters.

For many northern households, the central questions concern the prices of food, transportation, agricultural inputs, electricity and other essential goods.

The opposition is also seeking to exploit public frustration over insecurity, particularly in communities affected by banditry, kidnapping and disruptions to farming activities. These concerns are not imaginary.

Food and Agriculture Organisation reported in September that conflict was severely disrupting agricultural activities in several Nigerian states, including Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara.

Its assessment also highlighted the continuing effect of high food prices and insecurity on livelihoods. This creates a potentially receptive environment for opposition candidates promising a different economic and security approach.

Nevertheless, Atiku’s apparent momentum should not be overstated.

A large rally does not necessarily translate into an electoral majority, and no independently verified, comprehensive opinion poll establishes that he currently enjoys overwhelming support across the North-west.

What can be established is that Atiku retains a substantial electoral base in the north, he is actively seeking to expand it, and he has found a campaign message that connects with widespread concerns about living costs.

For Tinubu, that is sufficient reason to take the challenge seriously.

Seven APC Governors, But Where Are the Voters?

The greatest political advantage available to Tinubu in the North-west is that all seven governors are now members of APC. This represents a major departure from the political configuration of 2023.

The ruling party controls the governments of Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Jigawa, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara, giving it access to an extensive network of party structures and influential political officeholders.

In January, Kano State Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf, defected from NNPP to APC, altering the political configuration of a state where Kwankwaso had exercised considerable influence.

Zamfara Governor, Dauda Lawal, also moved into APC, strengthening the party’s formal control of the zone.

At the presidential campaign flag-off in Kaduna on October 24, the APC leadership presented party flags to the seven North-west governors, underscoring the importance it attaches to consolidating its dominance in the region.

On paper Tinubu possesses an electoral advantage that Atiku cannot easily replicate.

The governors can provide organisational coordination, mobilise party structures, and engage political stakeholders across their respective states.

But there is a difference between controlling a government and commanding the preferences of its electorate. The 2023 results demonstrated that voters do not always follow the political preferences of incumbent governors.

That reality has acquired greater importance in an election, where public dissatisfaction may prove more influential than conventional political loyalty.

The question is whether the seven governors can persuade voters, who are dissatisfied with national economic conditions, to support the continuation of the federal administration.

Tinubu’s possible decision to eventually visit every North-west state personally may reflect a recognition that the political structures of governors, however extensive, cannot entirely substitute for direct presidential engagement.

Kano: The Most Complicated Equation

Kano remains the North-west’s most intriguing electoral battlefield. In 2023, Kwankwaso’s 997,279 votes made the state his principal political stronghold and demonstrated the strength of his personal political organisation.

Tinubu finished second with 517,341 votes, while Atiku secured 131,716. The situation has since changed considerably.

Yusuf’s defection to APC in January has given the ruling party control of the state government, but Kwankwaso remains an important opposition figure.

Now running as Obi’s vice presidential candidate on the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC) ticket, Kwankwaso could complicate the contest between Tinubu and Atiku.

If he retains a substantial proportion of his 2023 support, APC may find it difficult to achieve a decisive victory even with the governor’s backing.

On the other hand, if Yusuf succeeds in transferring a significant part of NNPP’s former political structure to APC, Tinubu could improve considerably on his previous performance.

Atiku faces his own challenge. Although he maintains longstanding political relationships in Kano, his 2023 tally was far below those of Kwankwaso and Tinubu.

His task is not merely to benefit from dissatisfaction with the federal government, but to persuade voters, who previously supported other candidates, to consider him.

Kano could consequently become a three-way contest in which the ultimate result depends on grassroots mobilisation, the durability of Kwankwaso’s political network, and the ability of APC to exploit its control of the state government.

Katsina, Sokoto and Kebbi: The Margins That Matter

If Kano presents the largest numerical challenge, Katsina, Sokoto and Kebbi represent the states where relatively small shifts could have substantial political consequences.

Katsina is particularly sensitive because of its association with former President Muhammadu Buhari and the historic influence of APC in the state.

Despite that political heritage, Atiku defeated Tinubu there in 2023, although by a narrow margin. The president consequently has a reasonable opportunity to reverse the result if his campaign succeeds in consolidating the APC political organisation.

Yet, continuing insecurity, rural poverty, and economic hardship mean that the ruling party cannot rely exclusively on traditional loyalties. Sokoto presents a similar dilemma.

Atiku’s recent campaign reception, coming in a state he won by just 3,235 votes in 2023, has given ADC an opportunity to project growing momentum.

Tinubu’s original campaign itinerary already includes Sokoto, but the emerging political competition could make further engagement necessary.

Kebbi, where Atiku won by 37,087 votes, is another state in which APC could realistically seek to reverse its 2023 defeat.

The combined picture suggests that those three states may become crucial to the North-qest contest, not necessarily because of enormous voting margins, but precisely because their margins were relatively small.

A carefully organised campaign could change the outcome in any of them.

Zamfara, Kaduna and Jigawa: Different Challenges, Same Stakes

Zamfara presents Tinubu with the challenge of retaining a substantial victory while addressing the insecurity that has continued to affect parts of the state. His 2023 advantage over Atiku was 104,418 votes, giving APC a relatively strong position.

However, the political environment has changed, and the presence of Governor Dauda Lawal within APC introduces a new dimension to the party’s internal relationships.

The ruling party will need to reconcile its various political interests while demonstrating progress against the violence that has disrupted rural communities.

In Kaduna, Tinubu confronts a more substantial electoral deficit. Atiku’s advantage of 155,067 votes in 2023 was reinforced by the significant support Obi received, particularly among sections of the electorate concerned about religious representation and security.

Tinubu’s campaign began in Kaduna on October 24, demonstrating that the state is already considered a priority.

Governor Uba Sani’s political network and reconciliation initiatives may strengthen APC’s position, but the president will still need to persuade voters that conditions have improved sufficiently to justify another mandate.

Jigawa, meanwhile, offers a different calculation. Tinubu defeated Atiku there by 34,803 votes in 2023, giving APC a comparatively narrow advantage.

Governor Umar Namadi’s political organisation could help consolidate that support, but the state cannot be regarded as beyond the reach of the opposition.

Taken together, the three states illustrate why a uniform North-west campaign strategy may be inadequate. Each has distinct political interests, security challenges and electoral loyalties.

North-east and Danger of Wider Northern Rejection

Although the North-west has emerged as a particular concern, Tinubu’s challenge extends to the North-east, where Atiku enjoyed a considerable advantage in 2023.

Across the six North-east states, Atiku secured 1,741,846 votes, compared with Tinubu’s 1,185,458. The former vice-president defeated Tinubu by approximately 556,388 votes in the zone.

Atiku won Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe, while Tinubu prevailed only in Borno, Shettima’s political base.

For APC, the political realignments that have brought additional governors into its fold offer an opportunity to reduce that deficit.

But the fundamental electoral challenge remains. Atiku is from Adamawa and retains longstanding political relationships across the zone. His candidacy consequently poses a threat that cannot be neutralised merely by controlling additional state governments.

Tinubu’s original campaign schedule recognises this reality by including Adamawa, Bauchi and Borno among his planned personal appearances.

Nevertheless, a deterioration in the APC position in the North-west, combined with continued Atiku strength in the North-east, could create a difficult national electoral equation for the ruling party.

Can Tinubu Afford to Lose Northern Votes?

The numbers offer a useful illustration. Tinubu defeated Atiku nationwide by 1,810,206 votes in 2023.

In the North-west alone, Tinubu received 2,652,235 votes. If just 10 per cent of those North-west votes were to switch directly from Tinubu to Atiku in 2027, with every other voting pattern unchanged, the two candidates’ national margin would change by approximately 530,447 votes.

Such a shift would be sufficient to overturn Tinubu’s 2023 aggregate advantage over Atiku in the North-West. This is only an arithmetical illustration, not an election forecast. Actual voting in 2027 will involve other candidates, changes in turnout and potentially different alignments.

Nevertheless, the exercise demonstrates why APC cannot dismiss even relatively modest changes in northern voter preferences. The president does not necessarily need to repeat his exact 2023 performance in every state to win re-election.

But he must retain enough of the coalition that brought him to power while compensating for any losses with additional support elsewhere. That could prove difficult if dissatisfaction spreads simultaneously across several northern states.

The problem is compounded by the fact that APC’s opponents are not competing for precisely the same electorate. Atiku’s ADC is seeking to consolidate a largely northern political base while expanding into other regions.

Obi’s NDC ticket with Kwankwaso could retain significant support in the Middle Belt and Kano, alongside its southern constituencies.

Other candidates may also affect the distribution of votes in particular states. The president must therefore manage several electoral threats at once rather than concentrate exclusively on Atiku.

Economic Reforms Versus Everyday Realities

A central difficulty facing Tinubu is the gap between improvements in some macroeconomic indicators and the living conditions experienced by ordinary Nigerians.

The administration has defended its removal of fuel subsidies, foreign exchange reforms, and other policy changes as necessary measures to stabilise the economy and restore long-term growth.

The International Monetary Fund acknowledged in its June 2026 assessment that the reforms had improved economic resilience and supported stronger macroeconomic outcomes.

However, IMF also warned that living conditions remained difficult, estimating that poverty has reached 63 per cent under the national poverty line.

The World Bank similarly reported improvements in economic stability while emphasising the persistence of widespread poverty and the need for growth that translates into better employment and living standards.

For many voters in northern Nigeria, the political relevance of these assessments is immediate.

A farmer, who cannot cultivate his land because of insecurity may be less persuaded by improved foreign reserves than by the prospect of returning safely to his farm.

A trader facing higher transport costs may judge economic policy by the impact on business rather than by improvements in fiscal balances.

A household struggling with food prices may be unwilling to accept that macroeconomic progress automatically represents improved welfare.

The APC campaign must find a way to explain the benefits of its reforms without dismissing the difficulties experienced by the electorate.

Atiku, conversely, must demonstrate that his alternative economic programme offers a credible route to improving living conditions rather than simply expressing dissatisfaction with existing policies.

This contest between economic arguments and lived experience may be more influential than the number of governors or political endorsements available to either candidate.

Why Tinubu’s Original 12-State Strategy May No Longer Be Sufficient

APC’s original campaign timetable provided for Tinubu to personally attend rallies in Kaduna, Rivers, Plateau, Oyo, Borno, Enugu, Bauchi, Sokoto, Delta, Kano, Adamawa and Lagos.

The selection was clearly strategic. It included several states where Tinubu lost in 2023, alongside others considered important to maintaining existing support.

The broader party programme covered all 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, with governors and campaign officials assigned responsibility for rallies the president would not attend personally.

The arrangement appeared designed to allow Tinubu to concentrate on presidential responsibilities while participating directly in selected high-priority political engagements.

However, the changing campaign environment presents a different challenge.

A presidential election is not determined solely by the visibility of political structures. The personal presence of a candidate can influence campaign enthusiasm, attract undecided supporters and demonstrate the importance attached to particular communities.

The argument for expanding Tinubu’s North-west campaign rests on the political value of direct engagement.

Rather than restricting himself to Kaduna, Sokoto and Kano, the president could consider additional appearances in Katsina, Kebbi, Jigawa and Zamfara.

Such a decision would give him the opportunity to address security concerns, engage local political leaders, defend his economic policies, and appeal directly to voters in all seven states.

The possibility of extending the campaign to all 36 states would represent a more ambitious undertaking.

Yet with only a limited period remaining before the election, such a plan would require significant scheduling adjustments and greater delegation of official responsibilities.

For now, the original itinerary remains the publicly established programme. The possibility of further expansion should be understood as an emerging political calculation rather than an officially announced revision.

The Opposition’s Opportunity, and Its Own Difficulties

Atiku’s growing visibility in northern Nigeria has given ADC an opportunity to present itself as the principal alternative to the incumbent administration.

The former vice president’s longstanding relationships in the region, his familiarity with northern political structures, and his ability to campaign on the cost of living provide identifiable advantages.

Yet, he faces considerable obstacles. APC controls all seven North-west governorships and has attracted several prominent politicians from opposition parties.

Atiku must also contend with Kwankwaso’s influence in Kano and the wider challenge posed by the Obi-Kwankwaso ticket.

A divided opposition could enable Tinubu to secure victories with pluralities substantially below an outright majority of votes cast. There is also the question of whether Atiku can improve his performance outside the north.

In 2023, Tinubu benefited from a broad coalition that combined northern support with substantial votes in the South-west and other parts of the country.

Atiku cannot assume that a stronger northern showing alone would be sufficient to overturn the national result. He would need to prevent further losses in the south while expanding his electoral reach in the North-central and other competitive areas.

For Tinubu, the equivalent challenge is to preserve enough of his northern coalition while improving his performance in states he lost.

The real contest is not simply between a northern candidate and a southern incumbent, but between competing national coalitions with different strengths and vulnerabilities.

2027: Different Election, Different Reality

The greatest danger for APC would be to assume that the political conditions that produced Tinubu’s 2023 victory remain substantially unchanged. They do not.

The president now has the advantage of incumbency, wider political alliances, and the support of governors who were previously outside the ruling party.

But he also carries the political consequences of three years of economic reforms, persistent insecurity, and public expectations that have not always been met.

Atiku has the advantage of campaigning against the government’s record, but must overcome the organisational superiority of APC and the fragmentation of the opposition vote.

The North-west sits at the intersection of these competing realities. Its voters helped deliver the presidency to Tinubu in 2023, but the same region provided Atiku with victories in four states.

Its governors now belong to APC, but their political affiliations cannot determine how citizens will vote. Its communities have experienced the pressures of economic hardship and insecurity, yet their political responses will not necessarily be uniform.

The emerging lesson, for Tinubu, is that retaining the north may require more than the endorsements of influential politicians and the mobilisation of state governors.

It may require sustained personal engagement, convincing explanations of policy choices, and credible evidence that the government understands the difficulties facing ordinary citizens.

Whether that leads to visits to all seven North-west states or a much broader tour of the federation remains to be seen. What is increasingly evident is that the original 12-state calculation cannot be treated as politically untouchable.

Tinubu’s 2023 electoral coalition was built substantially on northern votes. The central challenge of 2027 is whether he can persuade enough of those voters to renew their confidence in his leadership.

To that extent, if the political atmosphere in the region becomes sufficiently competitive, the president may discover that the journey back to Aso Rock requires considerably more stops than he originally planned.